n optimistic doctrine of development_. What, then,
distinguishes Hegel from other idealists, philosophers of identity, and
teachers of development? What in particular distinguishes him from his
predecessor Schelling?

In Schelling nature is the subject and art the conclusion of the
development; his idealism has a physical and aesthetical character, as
Fichte's an ethical character. In Hegel, however, the concept is the
subject and goal of the development, his philosophy is, in the words of
Haym, a "_Logisierung_" of the world, a _logical idealism_.

The theory of identity is that system which looks upon nature and spirit as
one in essence and as phenomenal modes of an absolute which is above them
both. But while Schelling treats the real and the ideal as having equal
rights, Hegel restores the Fichtean subordination of nature to spirit,
without, however, sharing Fichte's contempt for nature. Nature is neither
co-ordinate with spirit nor a mere instrument for spirit, but a transition
stage in the development of the absolute, viz., the Idea in its other-being
_(Anderssein)_. It is spirit itself that becomes nature in order to become
actual, conscious spirit; before the absolute became nature it was already
spirit, not, indeed, "for itself" _(fuer sich)_, yet "in itself" _(an
sich)_, it was Idea or reason. The ideal is not merely the morning which
follows the night of reality, but also the evening which precedes it.
The absolute (the concept) develops from in-itself _(Ansich)_ through
out-of-self _(Aussersich)_ or other-being to for-itself _(Fuersich)_; it
exists first as reason (system of logical concepts), then as nature,
finally as living spirit. Thus Hegel's philosophy of identity is
distinguished from Schelling's by two factors: it subordinates nature to
spirit, and conceives the absolute of the beginning not as the indifference
of the real and ideal, but as ideal, as a realm of eternal thoughts.

The assertion that Hegel represents a synthesis of Fichte and Schelling is
therefore justified. This is true, further, for the character of Hegel's
thought as a whole, in so far as it follows a middle course between the
world-estranged, rigid abstractness of Fichte's thinking and Schelling's
artistico-fanciful intuition, sharing with the former its logical
stringency as well as its dominant interest in the philosophy of spirit,
and with the latter its wide outlook and its sense for the worth and the
richness of that which i