ss of the two is impossible so
long as we think _a_ as _one_ thing. That which is unsuccessful in this
case will succeed, perhaps, if in thought we break up the _a_ into several
things--[Greek: _a b g_]. Then we shall be able to explain through the
"together" (_Zusammen_) of this plurality what we were unable to explain
from the undecomposed _a_, or from the single constituents of it. The
"together" is a "relation" established by thought among the elements of the
real. For this reason Herbart terms his method of finding out necessary
supplements to the given "the method of relations." Another name for the
same thing is "the method of contingent aspects." Mechanics operates with
contingent aspects when, for the sake of explanation, it resolves a given
motion into several components. Such fictions and substitutions--auxiliary
concepts, which are not real, but which serve only as paths for
thought--may be successfully employed by metaphysics also. The abstract
expression of this method runs: The contradiction is to be removed by
thinking one of its members as manifold rather than as one. In order to
observe the workings of this Herbartian machine we shall go over the four
principal contradictions by which his acuteness is put to the test--the
problems of inherence, of change, of the continuous, of the ego.
We call the given sensation-complexes "things," and ascribe "properties" to
them. How can one and the same thing have different properties--how can
the one be at the same time many? To say that the thing "possesses" the
properties does not help the matter. The possession of the different
properties is itself just as manifold and various as the properties which
are possessed. Hence the concept of the thing and its properties must be
so transformed that the plurality which seems to be in the thing shall be
transferred without it. Instead of one thing let us assume several, each
with a single definite property, from whose "together" the appearance
of many qualities in one thing now arises. The appearance of manifold
properties in the one thing has its ground in the "together" of many
things, each of which has one simple quality. Again, it is just as
impossible for a thing to have different qualities in succession, or to
change, as it is for it to have them at the same time. The popular view
of change, which holds that a thing takes on different forms (ice, water,
steam) and yet remains the same substance, is untenable. How i
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