er, much of
value could hardly have been expected in view of the jejuneness of his
metaphysical conceptions and the insufficiency of his appreciation of evil.

It remains only to glance at Herbart's Aesthetics. The beautiful is
distinguished from the agreeable and the desirable, which, like it, are the
objects of preference and rejection, by the facts, first, that it arouses
an involuntary and disinterested judgment of approval; and second, that it
is a predicate which is ascribed to the object or is objective. To these is
added, thirdly, that while desire seeks for that which is to come, taste
possesses in the present that which it judges.

That which pleases or displeases is always the form, never the matter;
and further, is always a relation, for that which is entirely simple is
indifferent. As in music we have succeeded in discovering the simplest
relations, which please immediately and absolutely--we know not why--so
this must be attempted in all branches of the theory of art. The most
important among them, that which treats of moral beauty, moral philosophy,
has therefore to inquire concerning the simplest relations of will, which
call forth moral approval or disapproval (independently of the interest
of the spectator), to inquire concerning the practical Ideas or
pattern-concepts, in accordance with which moral taste, involuntarily and
with unconditional evidence, judges concerning the worth or unworth of
(actually happening or merely represented) volitions. Herbart enumerates
five such primary Ideas or fundamental judgments of conscience.

(1) The Idea of inner freedom compares the will with the judgment, the
conviction, the conscience of the agent himself. The agreement of his
desire with his own judgment, with the precept of his taste, pleases, lack
of agreement displeases. Since the power to determine the will according
to one's own insight of itself establishes only an empty consistency and
loyalty to conviction, and may also subserve immoral craft, the first Idea
waits for its content from the four following.

(2) The Idea of perfection has reference to the quantitative relations
of the manifold strivings of a subject, in intensity, extension, and
concentration. The strong is pleasing in contrast with the weak, the
greater (more extended, richer) in contrast with the smaller, the collected
in contrast with the scattered; in other words, in the individual
desires it is energy which pleases, in their sum va