ks_, 1883 _seq_.), and
Andrea Angiulli of Naples (died 1890; _Philosophy and the Schools_, 1889),
who explain matter and spirit as two phenomena of the same essence;
further, Giuseppe Sergi, Giovanni Cesca, and the psychiatrist, C. Lombroso,
the head of the positivistic school of penal law.
%2. France.%
Among the French philosophers of this century[1] none can compare in
far-reaching influence, both at home and abroad, with Auguste Comte,[2] the
creator of positivism (born at Montpellier in 1798, died at Paris in 1857),
whose chief work, the _Course of Positive Philosophy_, 6 vols., appeared in
1830 42. [English version, "freely translated and condensed," by Harriet
Martineau, 1853.]
[Footnote 1: Accounts of French philosophy in the nineteenth century have
been given by Taine (1857, 3d ed., 1867); Janet _(La Philosophie Francaise
Contemporaine_, 2d ed., 1879); A. Franck; Ferraz (3 vols., 1880-89); Felix
Ravaisson (2d ed., 1884); the Swede, J. Borelius _(Glances at the Present
Position of Philosophy in Germany and France_, German translation by Jonas,
1887); [and Ribot, _Mind_, vol. ii., 1877].]
[Footnote 2: On Comte cf. B. Puenjer, _Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische
Theologie_, 1878; R. Eucken, _Zur Wuerdigung Comtes und des Positivismus_,
in the _Aufsaetze zum Zellerjubilaeum_, 1887; Maxim. Bruett, _Der
Positivismus_, Programme of the _Realgymnasium des Johanneums_, Hamburg,
1889; [also, besides Mill, p. 560, John Morley, _Encyclopedia Britannica_,
vol. vi. pp. 229-238, and E. Caird, _The Social Philosophy and Religion of
Comte_, 1885.--Tr.]]
The positive philosophy seeks to put an end to the hoary error that
anything more is open to our knowledge than given facts--phenomena and
their relations. We do not know the essence of phenomena, and just
as little their first causes and ultimate ends; we know--by means of
observation, experiment, and comparison--only the constant relations
between phenomena, the relations of succession and of similarity among
facts, the uniformities of which we call their laws. All knowledge is,
therefore, relative; there is no absolute knowledge, for the inmost essence
of facts, and likewise their origin, the way in which they are produced,
is for us impenetrable. We know only, and this by experience, that the
phenomenon A is invariably connected with the phenomenon B, that the
second always follows on the first, and call the constant antecedent of a
phenomenon its cause. We know suc
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