combination possessed by the heterogeneous (the fusion of similars goes on
even without aid from consciousness, while the connection of dissimilars is
brought about only through the help of the latter), and adds to these two
general properties of the content of representation two further ones, its
revivability (its persistence in unconsciousness), and its dissolubility in
the scale of size, color, etc. Consciousness, on the other hand, which for
Fortlage coincides with the ego or self, is treated as the presupposition
of all representations, not as their result--it is underived activity. He
explains the nature of consciousness by the concept of attention,
characterizes them both as "questioning activity" (_Fragethaetigkeit_), and
follows them out in their various degrees from expectation through
observation up to reflection. The listening and watching of the hunter
when waiting for the game is only a prolongation of the same consciousness
which accompanies all less exciting representations. The essential element
in conscious or questioning activity is the oscillation between yes and no.

As soon as the disjunction is decided by a yes, the desire which lies at
its basis, and which in the condition of consciousness is arrested, passes
over into activity. All consciousness is based on interest, and in its
origin is "arrested impulse" (_Triebhemmung_). "The direction of impulse
to an intuition to be expected only in the future is called
consciousness." The rank of a being depends on its capacity for
reflection: the greater the extent of its attention and the smaller
the stimuli which suffice to rouse this to action, the higher it stands.
Impulse--this is the fundamental idea of Fortlage's psychology, like will
with Fichte, and representation with Herbart--consists of an element of
representation and an element of feeling.

Pleasure + effort-image = impulse.

[Footnote 1: Among Fortlage's other works we may mention his valuable
_History of Poetry_, 1839; the _Genetic History of Philosophy since Kant_,
1852; and the attractive _Six Philosophical Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872.]

In his metaphysical convictions, to which he gave expression in his
_Exposition and Criticism of the Arguments for the Existence of God_,
1840, among other works, Fortlage belongs to the philosophers of identity.
Originally sailing in Hegel's wake, he soon recognizes that the roots of
the theory of identity go back to the Kantio-Fichtean philosophy,