of religion: one theoretical, for the idea of God; the
other practical, for the worship of God. We are impelled to the assumption
of a suprasensible, an unconditioned, a providence, on the one hand, by the
desire for a unitary conclusion for our fragmentary knowledge of the world;
and, on the other, by moral need, by our unsatisfied longing after the
good. The attributes which we ascribe to God are taken from experience, the
abstract attributes from being in general, the naturalistic from the world,
the spiritual from man. As an inevitable outcome of the transformation of
religious feelings into representations, and one which is harmless because
of the unmistakableness of their symbolic character, the anthropomorphic
predicates, through which we think the Deity as personal, themselves
establish the superiority of theism over pantheism. The object of religion,
moreover, is accessible only to the subjective certitude of feeling which
is given by faith, and not to scientific knowledge.

Feuerbach's anthropological standpoint will be discussed below. Like
Friedrich Ueberweg (1826-71; professor in Koenigsberg; _System of Logic_,
1857, 5th ed., edited by J.B. Meyer, 1882--English translation, 1871), Karl
Fortlage was strongly influenced in his psychological views by Beneke.
Born in 1806 at Osnabrueck, and at his death in 1881 a professor in Jena,
Fortlage shared with Beneke an impersonality of character, as well as the
fate of meeting with less esteem from his contemporaries than he merited
by the seriousness and originality of his thinking. To his _System of
Psychology_, 1855, in two volumes, he added, as it were, a third volume,
his _Contributions to Psychology_, 1875, besides psychological lectures of
a more popular cast (_Eight Lectures_, 1869, 2d ed., 1872; _Four Lectures_,
1874).[1] Fortlage characterizes his psychological method--in the criticism
of which F.A. Lange fails to show the justice for which he is elsewhere
to be commended--as observation by the inner sense. In the first place,
consciousness, as the active form of representation, must be separated from
that of which we are conscious, from the "content of representation," which
is in itself unconscious, but capable of coming into consciousness. Next
Fortlage seeks to determine the laws of these two factors. In regard to
the content of representation he distinguishes more sharply than Herbart
between the fusibility of the homogeneous and the capacity for complex