eless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such
troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive
operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated
as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some
are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical
conception.

For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars
only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks
for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if
necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and
more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical
striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater
numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the
decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever
before.

The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are
placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this
principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that
he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong
advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and
therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his
army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be
employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as
much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the
numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the
actual war.

It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to
render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a
mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their
_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to
them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of
efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered.

Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An
increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more
than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is
supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the
establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient
will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality,
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