tion and fortification can supply. This is the
only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we
may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea.
In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to
be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a
World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England.
This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of
Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the
common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win
recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was
the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under
Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her
history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America
strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right
of nations for which every people craves." [A]
[Footnote A: Schiemann.]
In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this
vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us
in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which,
in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy,
has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the
unscrupulous suppression of her rivals.
If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and
takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage
than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our
allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her
forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the
two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea,
since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean
interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful
issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then
despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak,
on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be
compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet
to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to
the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an
absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval p
|