and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon
the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the
fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should
inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength
between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must
be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast
fortifications hold out.

No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a
defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows.
Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments
for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative
movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures
for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers.
The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we
shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy
"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet
must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the
enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by
attacking them directly.

If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they
would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English
force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus
contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing
forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected
to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be
dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a
balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in
mind.

So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for,
starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would
be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully
than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they
would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English
coast.

Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and
nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the
boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in
hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the
science of naval construc