nce was about to be taken. In 1856, he not
only adhered to Manin's call to all Italians to rally round the house
of Savoy, but went further than Manin in accepting unconditionally
what he called the 'Savoy Dictatorship,' to which he left full liberty
of choice in the matter of ways and means. He did justice then to
Cavour's patriotism: it was only after the sacrifice of Nice that a
feeling of bitter antagonism grew up in him for the man who he thought
had deceived Italy and himself. In December 1858, on a summons from
Cavour, he left Caprera (the island which he had bought with a little
inheritance falling to him on the death of his brother) and proceeded
to Turin, where he was informed of a plan for a rising in Massa and
Carrara, which was originally intended to be the signal of the war.
The plan was given up, but in March 1859, Garibaldi was told by Victor
Emmanuel in person of the imminence of war, and was invited to take
part in it as commander of an auxiliary corps of volunteers which took
the name of 'Cacciatori delle Alpi.' In this way, all his own
followers, not only those in arms, but the great mass of the people
which was obedient to his lead, became enrolled in the service of the
Sardinian monarchy; a fact of capital importance in the future
development of affairs. Without it, the Italian kingdom could not have
been formed. And this fact was due to Cavour, who had to fight the
arrayed strength of the old, narrow, military caste at Turin, which
had succeeded in getting Garibaldi's sword refused in 1848, and wished
for nothing in the world more than to get it refused in 1859. Near the
end of his life, Cavour said in the Chamber that the difficulties he
encountered in inducing the Sardinian War Office to sanction the
appointment were all but insurmountable. Unfortunately, the jealousy
of the heads of the regular army for the revolutionary captain never
ceased. As for Cavour, even when he opposed Garibaldi politically, he
always strove to have the highest personal honour paid to the man of
whom he once wrote 'that he had rendered Italy the greatest service
it was possible to render her.'

True to his _role_ of mystification, one week after the shot fired on
the 1st of January, Napoleon inserted an official statement in the
_Moniteur_ to the effect that, although public opinion had been
agitated by alarming rumours, there was nothing in the foreign
relations of France to justify the fears these rumours tended to