'got up' the Sicilian
expedition, it has been favoured to a certain degree, both by his
friends and foes; but it will not bear careful examination. As far as
Sicily goes (Naples is another thing), the most that can be brought
home to Cavour is a complicity of toleration; and even this statement
should be qualified by the addition, 'after the act.' It is true that,
in the early days after Villafranca, he had exclaimed: 'They have cut
me off from making Italy from the north, by diplomacy; very well, I
will make her from the south, by revolution!' True, also, that
earlier still, in 1856, he expressed the opinion, shared by every man
of common sense, that while the Bourbons ruled over the Two Sicilies
there would be no real peace for Italy. Nevertheless, in April 1860,
he neither thought the time ripe for the venture nor the means
employed adequate for its accomplishment. He was afraid that Garibaldi
would meet with the death of the Bandieras and Pisacane. No one was
more convinced than Cavour of the importance of Garibaldi's life to
Italy; and it is a sign of his true superiority of mind that this
conviction was never entertained more strongly than at the moment when
the general was passionately inveighing against him for the cession of
Nice. To Cavour such invectives seemed natural, and even justified
from one point of view; they excited in him no bitterness, and he was
only too happy that they fell upon himself and not upon the King,
since it was his fixed idea that, without the maintenance of a good
understanding between Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi, Italy would not
be made. Few men under the sting of personal attacks have shown such
complete self-control.
As has been stated, when Francis II. ascended the Neapolitan throne,
he was invited to join in the war with Austria, and he refused. Since
then, the same negative result had attended the reiterated counsels of
reform which the Piedmontese Government sent to that of Naples--the
young King showing, by repeated acts, that not Sardinia but Rome was
his monitress and chosen ally in Italy. The Pope had lately induced
the French General Lamoriciere to take the command of the Pontifical
troops, and he and the King of Naples were organising their armies,
with a view to co-operating at an early date against the common enemy
at Turin. In January 1860, Lord Russell wrote to Mr Elliot, the
English Minister at Naples: 'You will tell the King and his Ministers
that the Government
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