alarm at Turin, both on account of
his presumed influence over Garibaldi, the extent of which was much
exaggerated, and from the terror his name spread among European
diplomatists. The Dictator was asked to proscribe the man whose latest
act had been to give the last 30,000 francs he possessed in the world
to the expenses of the Calabrian campaign. He refused to do this. 'How
could I have insisted upon sending Mazzini into exile when he has done
so much for Italian unity?' he said afterwards to Victor Emmanuel, who
agreed that he was right. However, he allowed the Pro-Dictator
Pallavicini to write a letter to Mazzini, inviting him to show his
generosity by spontaneously leaving Naples in order to remove the
unjust fears occasioned by his presence. Mazzini replied, as he had a
perfect right to do, that every citizen is entitled to remain in a
free country as long as he does not break the laws. And so the
incident closed.

While the Party of Action urged Garibaldi not to give up Rome, other
influences were brought to bear on him in the opposite sense, and
especially that of the English Government, which instructed Admiral
Mundy to arrange a 'chance' meeting between the Dictator and the
English Minister at Naples, Mr. Elliot, on board the flagship
_Hannibal_. Mr. Elliot pointed out the likelihood of a European war
arising from an attack on Venice, and the certainty of French
intervention in case of a revolutionary dash on Rome. Garibaldi
replied that Rome was an Italian city, and that neither the Emperor
nor anyone else had a right to keep him out of it. 'He was evidently,'
writes Admiral Mundy in reporting the interview, 'not to be swayed by
any dictates of prudence.'

In Sicily, the rival factions were bringing about a state approaching
anarchy, but a flying visit from Garibaldi in the middle of September
averted the storm. At this time, Garibaldi's headquarters were at
Caserta, in the vast palace where Ferdinand II. breathed his last. The
Garibaldian and the Royal armies lay face to face with one another,
and each was engaged in completing its preparations. It might have
been expected, and for a moment it seems that Garibaldi did expect,
that after the solemn collapse of the Neapolitan army south of Naples,
the comedy was now only awaiting its final act and the fall of the
curtain. But it soon became apparent that, instead of the last act of
a comedy, the next might be the first of a tragedy. The troops
concentrated