ised, the weakest
points were the cavalry and the artillery. The infantry was good; not
only the picked corps of Bersaglieri, but also the line regiments were
equal to any troops likely to be opposed to them. No one can see the
fine appearance of a line regiment marching down the streets of an
Italian town without receiving the impression that, however much the
other branches of the service may have improved since the Sixties, the
fondest hopes of Italy in case of war still lie in that common soldier
who best supported the rigours of the Russian snows.

Unfortunately, the attention paid to the army was not extended to the
fleet, which continued totally unready; nor was the organisation of
the volunteers carried out in an efficient manner. The excuse
afterwards advanced was that not more than 15,000 enrolments were
expected, while the actual figure reached 35,000. Besides being from
its very bulk less manageable than the 'few and good' of 1859, this
mass of men was ill-provided with officers who could inspire and keep
discipline. Garibaldi's own generals, Bixio, Medici, Cosenz and
Sirtori, were now all in the regular army, and therefore not free to
join him. He begged for the loan of a few regular officers, indicating
amongst other names that of Colonel Pallavicini, who commanded against
him at Aspromonte: a trait characteristic of the man. But this
assistance, though promised, was not granted, and the same was the
case with the guns which were vainly asked for. Without charging La
Marmora with a deliberate intention of neglecting the volunteers, it
must be owned that under the influence of the prejudice which holds
irregular troops in small esteem, he did not do for them what ought to
have been done if their services were accepted at all.

The Austrian Southern Army, excellent in discipline and equipment
though weak in numbers, was commanded up to the outbreak of the war by
Field-Marshal Benedek, but he was called to Vienna to take command of
the unfortunate army of operation against Prussia, and was succeeded
in Italy by the Archduke Albrecht, with General Von John, an officer
of the first capacity, as chief of the staff.

The numerical strength of the forces which could be put in the field
has been stated with startling divergence by different military
writers on the war, but every calculation gives the Italian side
(exclusive of the volunteers) a superiority of not less than two to
one. The Austrian mobilised army