set
upon its acquisition. It is impossible to say how far, at the moment,
he was sincere in the renunciation. That, very soon after his return
to Paris, he was diligently weaving plans for getting both provinces
into his net, is evident from the tenor of the articles and notes
published in the 'inspired' French newspapers.

Two chief motives can be divined for Napoleon's determined opposition
to Italian unity which never ceased till Sedan. The first was his
wish, shared by all French politicians, that Italy should be weak. The
second was his regard for the Temporal Power which proceeded from his
still being convinced that he could not reign without the Clerical
vote. The French prelates were perpetually giving him reminders that
this vote depended on his keeping the Pope on his throne. For
instance, Cardinal Donnet told him at Bordeaux in October 1859, that
he could not choose a better way of showing his appreciation of the
Blessed Virgin than 'en menageant un triomphe a son Fils dans la
personne de son Vicaire.' It would be a triumph which the Catholic
world would salute with transport. Hints of this sort, the sense of
which was not hard to read, in spite of their recondite phraseology,
reached him from every quarter. He feared to set them aside. The
origins of his power were too much tainted for him to advance boldly
on an independent policy. Thus it was that bit by bit he deliberately
forfeited all title to the help of Italy when the same whirlwind that
dashed him to earth, cleared the way for the final accomplishment of
her national destinies.

Whilst Victor Emmanuel was more alive than Cavour to the military
arguments in favour of stopping hostilities when the tide of success
was at its height, he was not one whit more disposed to stultify his
past by becoming the vassal at once of Paris and Vienna. In a letter
written to the Emperor of the French in October, in answer to a very
long one in which Napoleon sought to convert him to the plan of an
Austro-Italian Confederation, he wound up by saying: 'For the
considerations above stated, and for many others, I cannot, Sire,
second your Majesty's policy in Italy. If your Majesty is bound by
treaties and cannot revoke your engagements in the (proposed)
congress, I, Sire, am bound on my side, by honour in the face of
Europe, by right and duty, by the interests of my house, of my people
and of Italy. My fate is joined to that of the Italian people. We can
succumb, but n