conduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through
their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all

XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until
they are forced to yield them

XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer
to temporize with it than to meet it with violence

XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the
Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the
free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp
for themselves that are pernicious to a State

XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought
about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the
liberties of that Republic

XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth
should not disdain the lower

XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is
a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to
ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect

XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the
course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice

XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different
Nations

XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to
be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes
may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth

XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or
to a haughty bearing from a humble

XLII. How easily men become corrupted

XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute
Soldiers

XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should
not with the same breath threaten and ask leave

XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not
to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity
in a City is most hurtful to the Governor

XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at
first to escape injury, and then to injure others

XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in
particulars they judge truly

XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless
or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is
utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest
degree noble a