expect to get the better of it easily, yet,
at the same time, not making it so great as to be formidable to its
neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it might long enjoy its
independence. For there are two causes which lead to wars being made
against a republic; one, your desire to be its master, the other the
fear lest it should master you; both of which dangers the precaution
indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we are to assume, this
republic be well prepared for defence, and consequently difficult of
attack, it will seldom or never happen that any one will form the design
to attack it, and while it keeps within its own boundaries, and is seen
from experience not to be influenced by ambition, no one will be led,
out of fear for himself, to make war upon it, more particularly when
its laws and constitution forbid its extension. And were it possible to
maintain things in this equilibrium, I veritably believe that herein
would be found the true form of political life, and the true tranquility
of a republic. But all human affairs being in movement, and incapable
of remaining as they are, they must either rise or fall; and to many
conclusions to which we are not led by reason, we are brought by
necessity. So that when we have given institutions to a State on the
footing that it is to maintain itself without enlargement, should
necessity require its enlargement, its foundations will be cut from
below it, and its downfall quickly ensue. On the other hand, were a
republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie under no necessity of making
war, the result of this ease would be to make it effeminate and divided
which two evils together, and each by itself, would insure its ruin. And
since it is impossible, as I believe, to bring about an equilibrium, or
to adhere strictly to the mean path, we must, in arranging our republic,
consider what is the more honourable course for it to take, and so
contrive that even if necessity compel its enlargement, it may be able
to keep what it gains.

But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us
to follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics,
for I know of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those
dissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as
evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of
Rome.

In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority
of the t