will assume, in the first place, the case of a very
corrupt city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has
reached a still greater height; but where corruption is universal, no
laws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it. Because as
good customs stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws, that
they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover, the laws
and institutions established in a republic at its beginning, when men
were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad; but
while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its
institutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the
introduction of new laws is of no avail, because the institutions,
remaining unchanged, corrupt them.

And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all
the institutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the
magistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions
of the State consisted in the authority of the people, the senate, the
tribunes, and the consuls; in the methods of choosing and appointing
magistrates; and in the arrangements for passing laws. These
institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the laws
by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law relating to
adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at elections, and
many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and more corrupted.
Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same although from
the corruption of the people no longer suitable, amendments in the laws
could not keep men good, though they might have proved very useful if
at the time when they were made the institutions had likewise been
reformed.

That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has
become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I mean
in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For the
Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of their
State on none save those who sought them; which was a good institution
at first, because then none sought these offices save those who thought
themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held disgraceful; so
that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best behaviour. But in a
corrupted city this institution grew to be most mischievous. For it was
no longer those of greatest worth, but those who had most in