neral and abstract ideas being more strangers
to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident
propositions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted, and
assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of
these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is
generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully
considered.

21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them
not innate.

But we have not yet done with "assenting to propositions at first
hearing and understanding their terms." It is fit we first take notice
that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of
the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and know
other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed
to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he
hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they
be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being in the
understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any
such,) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing
them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the
consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been
thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these
principles may be made more evident to us by others' teaching than
nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the
opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them;
but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our
other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied,
that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths
upon their being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds
in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not
before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it
was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things
contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how,
or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is
assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass
for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from
particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain
that not all, but only sagacious hea