ill be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that
principle of morality to be named, or, rule of virtue to be thought
on, (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society
together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies,)
which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general
fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and
rules of living quite opposite to others.

11. Whole Nations reject several Moral Rules.

Here perhaps it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule
is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good where
men, though they transgress, yet disown not the law; where fear of
shame, censure, or punishment, carries the mark of some awe it has upon
them. But it is impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should
all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them certainly and
infallibly knew to be a law; for so they must who have it naturally
imprinted on their minds. It is possible men may sometimes own rules of
morality which in their private thoughts they do not believe to be true,
only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are
persuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined that a whole
society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a
rule which they could not in their own minds but be infallibly certain
was a law; nor be ignorant that all men they should have to do with
knew it to be such: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from
others all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself
void of humanity: and one who, confounding the known and natural
measures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the professed
enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is
innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is
therefore little less than a contradiction to suppose, that whole
nations of men should, both in their professions and practice,
unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible
evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This
is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere
universally, and with public approbation or allowance, transgressed,
can be supposed innate.--But I have something further to add in answer
to this objection.

12. The generally allowed breach of a rule proof that it is