nor that the soul should subsist
and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery,
without the body. Let us then, I say, suppose the soul of Castor
separated during his sleep from his body, to think apart. Let us
suppose, too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of
another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul. For, if
Castor's soul can think, whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never
conscious of, it is no matter what PLACE it chooses to think in. We have
here, then, the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which
we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking
in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has
never the least perception. I ask, then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus
with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what
the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as
distinct PERSONS as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were?
And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very
miserable? Just by the same reason, they make the soul and the man two
persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of.
For, I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the
soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter.
For if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that
constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the
same person two days, or two moments, together.
13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they
think.
Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach that
the soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time SLEEP
WITHOUT DREAMING, can never be convinced that their thoughts are
sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it; and if
they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping
contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.
14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.
It will perhaps be said,--That the soul thinks even in the soundest
sleep, but the MEMORY retains it not. That the soul in a sleeping man
should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking
man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts,
is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare
assertion t
|