ct
consideration:--

First, there are some which are only variations, or different
combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any
other;--as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many
distinct units added together, and these I call SIMPLE MODES as being
contained within the bounds of one simple idea.

Secondly, there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds,
put together to make one complex one;--v.g. beauty, consisting of
a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight to the
beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the possession
of anything, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is
visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds: and these I
call MIXED MODES.

6. Ideas of Substances, single or collective.

Secondly, the ideas of SUBSTANCES are such combinations of simple ideas
as are taken to represent distinct PARTICULAR things subsisting by
themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as
it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the
simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of
weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead;
and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the
powers of motion, thought and reasoning, joined to substance, make the
ordinary idea of a man. Now of substances also, there are two sorts of
ideas:--one of SINGLE substances, as they exist separately, as of a man
or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of
men, or flock of sheep--which COLLECTIVE ideas of several substances
thus put together are as much each of them one single idea as that of a
man or an unit.

7. Ideas of Relation.

Thirdly, the last sort of complex ideas is that we call RELATION, which
consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another.

Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.

8. The abstrusest Ideas we can have are all from two Sources.

If we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how
it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from
sensation or reflection, it will lead us further than at first perhaps
we should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find, if we warily
observe the originals of our notions, that EVEN THE MOST ABSTRUSE IDEAS,
how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any ope