me thing, who either change the signification of words, which I would
not suspect them of,--they having so severely condemned the philosophy
of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain
meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If,
therefore, they mean by body and extension the same that other people
do, viz. by BODY something that is solid and extended, whose parts are
separable and movable different ways; and by EXTENSION, only the space
that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and
which is possessed by them,--they confound very different ideas one with
another; for I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of
space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea
of scarlet colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension,
neither can scarlet colour exist without extension, but this hinders
not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others, as
necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct
ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived, without space; and yet
motion is not space, nor space motion; space can exist without it, and
they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and
solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that
depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication
of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove that spirit is
different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension
in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space
is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it; SPACE
and SOLIDITY being as distinct ideas as THINKING and EXTENSION, and as
wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body then and extension,
it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,

12. Extension not solidity.

First, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of
body, as body does.

13. The parts of space inseparable, both really and mentally.

Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other;
so that the continuity cannot be separated, both neither really nor
mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another,
with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide
and separate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from
another, to make two superficies, where bef