their minds agrees to
what their practice contradicts. I answer, first, I have always thought
the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But,
since it is certain that most men's practices, and some men's open
professions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is
impossible to establish an universal consent, (though we should look for
it only amongst grown men,) without which it is impossible to conclude
them innate. Secondly, it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose
innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation.
Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for operation, and
must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative assent to
their truth, or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative
maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an
aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which
(as practical principles ought) DO continue constantly to operate and
influence all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all
persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are INCLINATIONS
OF THE APPETITE to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding.
I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of
men; and that from the very first instances of sense and perception,
there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them;
some things that they incline to and others that they fly: but this
makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be
the principles of knowledge regulating our practice. Such natural
impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby,
that this is an argument against them; since, if there were certain
characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles
of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us
and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and
appetite; which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of
all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling
us.

4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ERGO not innate.

Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles
is, that I think THERE CANNOT ANY ONE MORAL RULE BE PROPOSED WHEREOF A
MAN MAY NOT JUSTLY DEMAND A REASON: which would be perfectly ridiculous
and absurd if they were innate; or so much as self-evident, which every
innate p