?' 'Impossible.' 'But how can individuals
participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?' 'That
is not an easy question to answer.' 'I should imagine the conception of
ideas to arise as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common
form or idea of greatness, which you abstract.' 'That is quite true.'
'And supposing you embrace in one view the idea of greatness thus gained
and the individuals which it comprises, a further idea of greatness
arises, which makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.'
Socrates replies that the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in
this case, the consequence would no longer follow. 'But must not the
thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea? And
if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not
all things think? Or can thought be without thought?' 'I acknowledge the
unmeaningness of this,' says Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse
to the explanation that the ideas are types in nature, and that other
things partake of them by becoming like them.' 'But to become like them
is to be comprehended in the same idea; and the likeness of the idea and
the individuals implies another idea of likeness, and another without
end.' 'Quite true.' 'The theory, then, of participation by likeness
has to be given up. You have hardly yet, Socrates, found out the real
difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.' 'What difficulty?' 'The
greatest of all perhaps is this: an opponent will argue that the ideas
are not within the range of human knowledge; and you cannot disprove the
assertion without a long and laborious demonstration, which he may be
unable or unwilling to follow. In the first place, neither you nor any
one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm that they
are subjective.' 'That would be a contradiction.' 'True; and therefore
any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns themselves
only; and the objects which are named after them, are relative to one
another only, and have nothing to do with the ideas themselves.' 'How do
you mean?' said Socrates. 'I may illustrate my meaning in this way: one
of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is relative
to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of ideas,
however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave to
us.--Do you see my meaning?' 'Perfectly.' 'And absolute knowledge in
the same way corresponds