into another
State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the rights of person, with
all the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the
State. And if persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and
of the United States, they would be entitled to all of these
privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not
restrict them; for they would hold these privileges and immunities
under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution
and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the
States could limit or restrict them, or place the party in an inferior
grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning, and could
have no operation; and would give no rights to the citizen when in
another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose to
allow him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the
clause in question. It guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State
cannot withhold them. And these rights are of a character and would
lead to consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African
race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were
not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these
privileges and immunities were provided for the protection of the
citizen in other States.

The case of Legrand _v._ Darnall (2 Peters, 664) has been referred to
for the purpose of showing that this court has decided that the
descendant of a slave may sue as a citizen in a court of the United
States; but the case itself shows that the question did not arise and
could not have arisen in the case.

It appears from the report, that Darnall was born in Maryland, and was
the son of a white man by one of his slaves, and his father executed
certain instruments to manumit him, and devised to him some landed
property in the State. This property Darnall afterwards sold to
Legrand, the appellant, who gave his notes for the purchase-money. But
becoming afterwards apprehensive that the appellee had not been
emancipated according to the laws of Maryland, he refused to pay the
notes until he could be better satisfied as to Darnall's right to
convey. Darnall, in the mean time, had taken up his residence in
Pennsylvania, and brought suit on the notes, and recovered judgment in
the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland.

The whole proceeding, a