land."
Whether, therefore, we take the particular clause in question, by
itself, or in connection with the other provisions of the
Constitution, we think it clear, that it applies only to the
particular territory of which we have spoken, and cannot, by any just
rule of interpretation, be extended to territory which the new
Government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation.
Consequently, the power which Congress may have lawfully exercised in
this Territory, while it remained under a Territorial Government, and
which may have been sanctioned by judicial decision, can furnish no
justification and no argument to support a similar exercise of power
over territory afterwards acquired by the Federal Government. We put
aside, therefore, any argument, drawn from precedents, showing the
extent of the power which the General Government exercised over
slavery in this Territory, as altogether inapplicable to the case
before us.
But the case of the American and Ocean Insurance Companies _v._ Canter
(1 Pet., 511) has been quoted as establishing a different construction
of this clause of the Constitution. There is, however, not the
slightest conflict between the opinion now given and the one referred
to; and it is only by taking a single sentence out of the latter and
separating it from the context, that even an appearance of conflict
can be shown. We need not comment on such a mode of expounding an
opinion of the court. Indeed it most commonly misrepresents instead of
expounding it. And this is fully exemplified in the case referred to,
where, if one sentence is taken by itself, the opinion would appear to
be in direct conflict with that now given; but the words which
immediately follow that sentence show that the court did not mean to
decide the point, but merely affirmed the power of Congress to
establish a Government in the Territory, leaving it an open question,
whether that power was derived from this clause in the Constitution,
or was to be necessarily inferred from a power to acquire territory by
cession from a foreign Government. The opinion on this part of the
case is short, and we give the whole of it to show how well the
selection of a single sentence is calculated to mislead.
The passage referred to is in page 542, in which the court, in
speaking of the power of Congress to establish a Territorial
Government in Florida until it should become a State, uses the
following language:
"In the mean time Florida
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