arge, p. 50.)

In answer to this ground, the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion
of the court, observed: "The argument assumes that the six articles
which that ordinance declares to be perpetual, are still in force in
the States since formed within the territory, and admitted into the
Union. If this proposition could be maintained, it would not alter the
question; for the regulations of Congress, under the old Confederation
or the present Constitution, for the government of a particular
Territory, could have no force beyond its limits. It certainly could
not restrict the power of the States, within their respective
territories, nor in any manner interfere with their laws and
institutions, nor give this court control over them.

"The ordinance in question, he observes, if still in force, could have
no more operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of Kentucky, and
could not influence the decision upon the rights of the master or the
slaves in that State."

This view, thus authoritatively declared, furnishes a conclusive
answer to the distinction attempted to be set up between the
extra-territorial effect of a State law and the act of Congress in
question.

It must be admitted that Congress possesses no power to regulate or
abolish slavery within the States; and that, if this act had attempted
any such legislation, it would have been a nullity. And yet the
argument here, if there be any force in it, leads to the result, that
effect may be given to such legislation; for it is only by giving the
act of Congress operation within the State of Missouri, that it can
have any effect upon the question between the parties. Having no such
effect directly, it will be difficult to maintain, upon any consistent
reasoning, that it can be made to operate indirectly upon the subject.

The argument, we think, in any aspect in which it may be viewed, is
utterly destitute of support upon any principles of constitutional
law, as, according to that, Congress has no power whatever over the
subject of slavery within the State; and is also subversive of the
established doctrine of international jurisprudence, as, according to
that, it is an axiom that the laws of one Government have no force
within the limits of another, or extra-territorially, except from the
consent of the latter.

It is perhaps not unfit to notice, in this connection, that many of
the most eminent statesmen and jurists of the country entertain the
opinion that