Union."

Again he says, "with respect to what has taken place in the Northwest
territory, it may be observed that the ordinance giving it its
distinctive character on the subject of slaveholding proceeded from
the old Congress, acting with the best intentions, but under a charter
which contains no shadow of the authority exercised; and it remains to
be decided how far the States formed within that territory, and
admitted into the Union, are on a different footing from its other
members as to their legislative sovereignty. As to the power of
admitting new States into the Federal compact, the questions offering
themselves are, whether Congress can attach conditions, or the new
States concur in conditions, which after admission would _abridge_ or
_enlarge_ the constitutional rights of legislation common to other
States; whether Congress can, by a compact with a new State, take
power either to or from itself, or place the new member above or below
the equal rank and rights possessed by the others; whether all such
stipulations expressed or implied would not be nullities, and be so
pronounced when brought to a practical test. It falls within the scope
of your inquiry to state the fact, that there was a proposition in the
convention to discriminate between the old and the new States by an
article in the Constitution. The proposition, happily, was rejected.
The effect of such a discrimination is sufficiently evident."[2]

[Footnote 2: Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, November 27th,
1819, on the subject of the Missouri Compromise.]

In support of the ordinance of 1787, there may be adduced the
semblance at least of obligation deducible from _compact_, the _form_
of assent or agreement between the grantor and grantee; but this form
or similitude, as is justly remarked by Mr. Madison, is rendered null
by the absence of power or authority in the contracting parties, and
by the more intrinsic and essential defect of incompatibility with the
rights and avowed purposes of those parties, and with their relative
duties and obligations to others. If, then, with the attendant
_formalities_ of assent or compact, the restrictive power claimed was
void as to the immediate subject of the ordinance, how much more
unfounded must be the pretension to such a power as derived from that
source, (viz: the ordinance of 1787,) with respect to territory
acquired by purchase or conquest under the supreme authority of the
Constitution--terr