s appears by the report, was an amicable one;
Legrand being perfectly willing to pay the money, if he could obtain a
title, and Darnall not wishing him to pay unless he could make him a
good one. In point of fact, the whole proceeding was under the
direction of the counsel who argued the case for the appellee, who was
the mutual friend of the parties, and confided in by both of them, and
whose only object was to have the rights of both parties established
by judicial decision in the most speedy and least expensive manner.
Legrand, therefore, raised no objection to the jurisdiction of the
court in the suit at law, because he was himself anxious to obtain the
judgment of the court upon his title. Consequently, there was nothing
in the record before the court to show that Darnall was of African
descent, and the usual judgment and award of execution was entered.
And Legrand thereupon filed his bill on the equity side of the Circuit
Court, stating that Darnall was born a slave, and had not been legally
emancipated, and could not therefore take the land devised to him, nor
make Legrand a good title; and praying an injunction to restrain
Darnall from proceeding to execution on the judgment, which was
granted. Darnall answered, averring in his answer that he was a free
man, and capable of conveying a good title. Testimony was taken on
this point, and at the hearing the Circuit Court was of opinion that
Darnall was a free man and his title good, and dissolved the
injunction and dismissed the bill; and that decree was affirmed here,
upon the appeal of Legrand.
Now, it is difficult to imagine how any question about the citizenship
of Darnall, or his right to sue in that character, can be supposed to
have arisen or been decided in that case. The fact that he was of
African descent was first brought before the court upon the bill in
equity. The suit at law had then passed into judgment and award of
execution, and the Circuit Court, as a court of law, had no longer any
authority over it. It was a valid and legal judgment, which the court
that rendered it had not the power to reverse or set aside. And unless
it had jurisdiction as a court of equity to restrain him from using
its process as a court of law, Darnall, if he thought proper, would
have been at liberty to proceed on his judgment, and compel the
payment of the money, although the allegations in the bill were true,
and he was incapable of making a title. No other court coul
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