y, over which the United States had the exclusive control,
and in respect to which they are an independent sovereign power.
Whether the laws now in question were constitutionally enacted, I
repeat once more, is a separate question. But, assuming that they
were, and that they operated directly on the _status_ of the
plaintiff, I consider that no other State or country could question
the rightful power of the United States so to legislate, or,
consistently with the settled rules of international law, could refuse
to recognise the effects of such legislation upon the _status_ of
their officers and servants, as valid everywhere.

This alone would, in my apprehension, be sufficient to decide this
question.

But there are other facts stated on the record which should not be
passed over. It is agreed that, in the year 1836, the plaintiff, while
residing in the Territory, was married, with the consent of Dr.
Emerson, to Harriet, named in the declaration as his wife, and that
Eliza and Lizzie were the children of that marriage, the first named
having been born on the Mississippi river, north of the line of
Missouri, and the other having been born after their return to
Missouri. And the inquiry is, whether, after the marriage of the
plaintiff in the Territory, with the consent of Dr. Emerson, any other
State or country can, consistently with the settled rules of
international law, refuse to recognise and treat him as a free man,
when suing for the liberty of himself, his wife, and the children of
that marriage. It is in reference to his _status_, as viewed in other
States and countries, that the contract of marriage and the birth of
children becomes strictly material. At the same time, it is proper to
observe that the female to whom he was married having been taken to
the same military post of Fort Snelling as a slave, and Dr. Emerson
claiming also to be her master at the time of her marriage, her
_status_, and that of the children of the marriage, are also affected
by the same considerations.

If the laws of Congress governing the Territory of Wisconsin were
constitutional and valid laws, there can be no doubt these parties
were capable of contracting a lawful marriage, attended with all the
usual civil rights and obligations of that condition. In that
Territory they were absolutely free persons, having full capacity to
enter into the civil contract of marriage.

It is a principle of international law, settled beyond contro