_status_ of slavery, must depend on the municipal law which creates
and upholds it.
And not only must the _status_ of slavery be created and measured by
municipal law, but the rights, powers, and obligations, which grow out
of that _status_, must be defined, protected, and enforced, by such
laws. The liability of the master for the torts and crimes of his
slave, and of third persons for assaulting or injuring or harboring or
kidnapping him, the forms and modes of emancipation and sale, their
subjection to the debts of the master, succession by death of the
master, suits for freedom, the capacity of the slave to be party to a
suit, or to be a witness, with such police regulations as have existed
in all civilized States where slavery has been tolerated, are among
the subjects upon which municipal legislation becomes necessary when
slavery is introduced.
Is it conceivable that the Constitution has conferred the right on
every citizen to become a resident on the territory of the United
States with his slaves, and there to hold them as such, but has
neither made nor provided for any municipal regulations which are
essential to the existence of slavery?
Is it not more rational to conclude that they who framed and adopted
the Constitution were aware that persons held to service under the
laws of a State are property only to the extent and under the
conditions fixed by those laws; that they must cease to be available
as property, when their owners voluntarily place them permanently
within another jurisdiction, where no municipal laws on the subject of
slavery exist; and that, being aware of these principles, and having
said nothing to interfere with or displace them, or to compel Congress
to legislate in any particular manner on the subject, and having
empowered Congress to make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory of the United States, it was their intention
to leave to the discretion of Congress what regulations, if any,
should be made concerning slavery therein? Moreover, if the right
exists, what are its limits, and what are its conditions? If citizens
of the United States have the right to take their slaves to a
Territory, and hold them there as slaves, without regard to the laws
of the Territory, I suppose this right is not to be restricted to the
citizens of slaveholding States. A citizen of a State which does not
tolerate slavery can hardly be denied the power of doing the same
thing. And w
|