been decided by this court, that the stipulation was
temporary, and ceased to have any effect when the then inhabitants of
the Territory of Louisiana, in whose behalf the stipulation was made,
were incorporated into the Union.

In the cases of New Orleans _v._ De Armas et al., (9 Peters, 223,) the
question was, whether a title to property, which existed at the date
of the treaty, continued to be protected by the treaty after the State
of Louisiana was admitted to the Union. The third article of the
treaty was relied on. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: "This article
obviously contemplates two objects. One, that Louisiana shall be
admitted into the Union as soon as possible, on an equal footing with
the other States; and the other, that, till such admission, the
inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be protected in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. Had any one of
these rights been violated while these stipulations continued in
force, the individual supposing himself to be injured might have
brought his case into this court, under the twenty-fifth section of
the judicial act. But this stipulation ceased to operate when
Louisiana became a member of the Union, and its inhabitants were
'admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and
immunities, of citizens of the United States.'"

The cases of Chouteau _v._ Marguerita, (12 Peters, 507,) and Permoli
_v._ New Orleans, (3 How., 589,) are in conformity with this view of
the treaty.

To convert this temporary stipulation of the treaty, in behalf of
French subjects who then inhabited a small portion of Louisiana, into
a permanent restriction upon the power of Congress to regulate
territory then uninhabited, and to assert that it not only restrains
Congress from affecting the rights of property of the then
inhabitants, but enabled them and all other citizens of the United
States to go into any part of the ceded territory with their slaves,
and hold them there, is a construction of this treaty so opposed to
its natural meaning, and so far beyond its subject-matter and the
evident design of the parties, that I cannot assent to it. In my
opinion, this treaty has no bearing on the present question.

For these reasons, I am of opinion that so much of the several acts of
Congress as prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude within that
part of the Territory of Wisconsin lying north of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes north latitude, an