d liberate the slave, he
must, by an authority equally imperious, be declared free. Every
argument which supports the right of the master on one side, based
upon the force of written law, must be equally conclusive in favor of
the slave, when he can point out in the statute the clause which
secures his freedom."

And he further said:

"Free people of color in all the States are, it is believed, quasi
citizens, or, at least, denizens. Although none of the States may
allow them the privilege of office and suffrage, yet all other civil
and conventional rights are secured to them; at least, such rights
were evidently secured to them by the ordinance in question for the
government of Indiana. If these rights are vested in that or any other
portion of the United States, can it be compatible with the spirit of
our confederated Government to deny their existence in any other part?
Is there less comity existing between State and State, or State and
Territory, than exists between the despotic Governments of Europe?"

These are the words of a learned and great judge, born and educated in
a slave State.

I now come to inquire, under the sixth and last head, "whether the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the question before us,
are binding on this court."

While we respect the learning and high intelligence of the State
courts, and consider their decisions, with others, as authority, we
follow them only where they give a construction to the State statutes.
On this head, I consider myself fortunate in being able to turn to the
decision of this court, given by Mr. Justice Grier, in Pease _v._
Peck, a case from the State of Michigan, (18 Howard, 589,) decided in
December term, 1855. Speaking for the court, Judge Grier said:

"We entertain the highest respect for that learned court, (the Supreme
Court of Michigan) and in any question affecting the construction of
their own laws, where we entertain any doubt, would be glad to be
relieved from doubt and responsibility by reposing on their decision.
There are, it is true, many dicta to be found in our decisions,
averring that the courts of the United States are bound to follow the
decisions of the State courts on the construction of their own laws.
But although this may be correct, yet a rather strong expression of a
general rule, it cannot be received as the annunciation of a maxim of
universal application. Accordingly, our reports furnish many cases of
exceptions to