s description of the uses
of such a traverse, contained in his excellent analysis of pleadings,
(Steph. on Pl., 176,) it will be seen how precisely this plea meets
one of his descriptions. No doubt the defendant might have traversed,
by a common or general traverse, the plaintiff's allegation that he
was a citizen of the State of Missouri, concluding to the country. The
issue thus presented being joined, would have involved matter of law,
on which the jury must have passed, under the direction of the court.
But by traversing the plaintiff's citizenship specially--that is,
averring those facts on which the defendant relied to show that in
point of law the plaintiff was not a citizen, and basing the traverse
on those facts as a deduction therefrom--opportunity was given to do,
what was done; that is, to present directly to the court, by a
demurrer, the sufficiency of those facts to negative, in point of law,
the plaintiff's allegation of citizenship. This, then, being a
special, and not a general or common traverse, the rule is settled,
that the facts thus set out in the plea, as the reason or ground of
the traverse must of themselves constitute, in point of law, a
negative of the allegation thus traversed. (Stephen on Pl., 183; Ch.
on Pl., 620.) And upon a demurrer to this plea, the question which
arises is, whether the facts, that the plaintiff is a negro, of
African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and were
brought into this country and sold as negro slaves, _may all be true,
and yet_ the plaintiff be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within
the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which
confer on citizens of one State the right to sue citizens of another
State in the Circuit Courts. Undoubtedly, if these facts, taken
together, amount to an allegation that, at the time of action brought,
the plaintiff was himself a slave, the plea is sufficient. It has been
suggested that the plea, in legal effect, does so aver, because, if
his ancestors were sold as slaves, the presumption is they continued
slaves; and if so, the presumption is, the plaintiff was born a slave;
and if so, the presumption is, he continued to be a slave to the time
of action brought.

I cannot think such presumptions can be resorted to, to help out
defective averments in pleading; especially, in pleading in abatement,
where the utmost certainty and precision are required. (Chitty on Pl.,
457.) That the plainti