great nicety
into those things, perhaps with truth on their side, but with little
general advantage; for they maintain that there is no good man but the
wise man. Be it so, yet they define wisdom to be such as no mortal has
ever attained to; whereas we ought to contemplate those things which
exist in practise and in common life, and not the subjects of fictions
or of our own wishes. I would never pretend to say that Caius
Fabricius, Marius Curius, and Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors
esteemed wise, were wise according to the standard of these moralists.
Wherefore let them keep to themselves the name of wisdom, both
invidious and unintelligible, and let them allow that these were good
men--nay, they will not even do that; they will declare that this can
not be granted except to a wise man.

Let us therefore proceed with our dull genius, as they say. Those who
so conduct themselves and so live that their honor, their integrity,
their justice, and liberality are approved; so that there is not in
them any covetousness, or licentiousness, or boldness; and that they
are of great consistency, as those men whom I have mentioned
above--let us consider these worthy of the appellation of good men, as
they have been accounted such, because they follow (as far as men are
able) nature, which is the best guide of a good life. For I seem to
myself to have this view, that we are so formed by nature that there
should be a certain social tie among all; stronger, however, as each
approaches nearer us. Accordingly, citizens are preferable to
foreigners, and relatives to strangers; for with the last-named,
Nature herself has created a friendly feeling, tho this has not
sufficient strength. For in this respect friendship is superior to
relationship, because from relationship benevolence can be withdrawn
and from friendship it can not; for with the withdrawal of benevolence
the very name of friendship is done away, while that of relationship
remains. Now how great the power of friendship is may be best gathered
from this consideration, that out of the boundless society of the
human race, which Nature herself has joined together, friendship is a
matter so contracted, and brought into so narrow a compass, that the
whole of affection is confined to two, or at any rate to very few.

Now friendship is nothing else than a complete union of feeling on all
subjects, divine and human, accompanied by kindly feeling and
attachment, than which, in