er ready, and reluctance far
from us; but that we take pleasure in freely giving our advice; that
in our friendship, the influence of our friends, when they give good
advice, should have great weight; and that this be employed to
admonish not only candidly, but even severely, if the case shall
require, and that we give heed to it when so employed; for, as to
certain persons whom I understand to have been esteemed wise men in
Greece, I am of opinion that some strange notions were entertained by
them; but there is nothing which they do not follow up with too great
subtlety; among the rest, that excessive friendships should be
avoided, lest it should be necessary for one to feel anxiety for many;
that every one has enough, and more than enough, of his own affairs;
that to be needlessly implicated in those of other people is
vexatious; that it was most convenient to hold the reins of friendship
as loose as possible, so as either to tighten or slacken them when you
please; for they argue that the main point toward a happy life is
freedom from care, which the mind can not enjoy if one man be, as it
were, in travail for others.
Nay, they tell us that some are accustomed to declare, still more
unfeelingly (a topic which I have briefly touched upon just above),
that friendships should be cultivated for the purpose of protection
and assistance, and not for kind feeling or affection; and therefore
the less a man possesses of independence and of strength, in the same
degree he most earnestly desires friendships; that thence it arises
that women seek the support of friendship more than men, and the poor
more than the rich, and persons in distress rather than those who are
considered prosperous. Admirable philosophy! for they seem to take
away the sun from the world who withdraw friendship from life; for we
receive nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more
delightful; for what is this freedom from care?--in appearances,
indeed, flattering; but, in many eases, in reality to be disdained.
Nor is it reasonable to undertake any honorable matter or action lest
you should be anxious, or to lay it aside when undertaken; for if we
fly from care, we must fly from virtue also; for it is impossible that
she can, without some degree of distress, feel contempt and
detestation for qualities opposed to herself; just as kind-heartedness
for malice, temperance for profligacy, and bravery for cowardice.
Accordingly, you see that upright me
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