dmitted to
be heard in his petition, provided it be respectful in terms, even
although he pray expressly for a downright revolution in the
government, as did the thousands of petitioners who thus carried
through, in our own time, the great measure of parliamentary reform?
And shall the People in republican America, with its written
constitution for the protection of the public rights, and by a body
of strictly limited powers,--shall the People here be forbidden to
do that which they may freely do in the monarchy of England, having
no guaranties for the public liberty except laws and prescriptive
usages, all of them confessedly at the will of an omnipotent
Parliament? Forbid it, reason! Forbid it, justice! Forbid it,
liberty! Forbid it the beatified spirits of the revolutionary sages,
who watch in heaven over the destinies of the Republic!
Aye, but, say gentlemen, if such things are not done by the
representatives of the People in monarchical England, they have been
done by their representatives in democratic America. We are told of
precedents at home. What are those precedents?
To begin, I throw aside, as wholly inapplicable to the question, or
at least as evasive of it, the case of petitions refused on account
of disrespectful language towards the persons or the body
petitioned. Those constitute a standing exception, independent of
the merits of the subject.
The proceedings of this House in 1790, in reference to petitions on
the matter of the slave trade, and of slavery in the States, have
been cited. It has been said that those petitions were not received.
That is a mistake, as any gentleman may satisfy himself by
recurrence to the journals of the House. The petitions were
received, committed, and debated on report, as I shall have occasion
hereafter to state at length.
One other case is cited, that of the petition of Vicente Pazos,
agent of New Granada, which, in the year 1818, the House refused to
receive. But the printed debates of that day show clearly the ground
of rejection. Mr. Forsyth moved that it be not received. "He stated
that, as the petitioner was the agent of a foreign power, and
applied to Congress as an appellate power over the Executive, he
thought it improper that he should be thus heard." And the question
was decided upon this single point. I heartily approve the remarks
then made by a distinguished statesman, now no more, who at that
time represented Massachusetts on this floor.
Mr. M
|