ed and
prescribed in their letters of appointment, and the general laws of
the land; that the constituents of a member of this House have the
right to give instructions to him individually; and that every
individual one of the People has a right to be heard by petition on
the floor of this House. These are among the things which I
understand to constitute the principles of democracy: those general
principles, which I learned in my boyhood with my catechism, in the
bill of rights prefixed to the constitution of my own State; which,
on maturer study, I have seen to be avowed more or less distinctly,
in all the constitutions of this Republic, and of each of its
constituent Republics; which I perceive to be defended and applauded
in the writings of the great text authors of political science in
modern times; and which after being for the first time practically
exemplified in our own institutions, have gone forth over the
universe, toppling down thrones, and raising up freemen, through all
the nations of Christendom.

And whilst I feel impelled by such convictions to resist the summary
rejection of this Petition upon principle, I am irresistibly led to
the same conclusion by considerations of policy and expediency. I
deny that such considerations should decide the question; but seeing
they have been urged into it, I shall concede to them all due
respect.

We have been told that the prayer of the Petition is for a thing
which the Constitution does not permit to Congress, and so the
petition itself should not be received. I ask of the House how it
appears that we have no right by the Constitution to legislate upon
the subject matter of the Petition? It may be so; and it may not.
One member of the House has earnestly averred that it is; another
that it is not. Which of them is right? I confess, for myself, that
I cannot think it becomes the House to decide either way, upon the
mere _ipse dixit_ of individual members. Besides, the Petition calls
in question not only slavery, but also the _commerce in slaves_. And
will any gentleman affirm that the slave trade of the District is
among those holy things which Congress may not constitutionally
handle? Is this District set apart by the Constitution, under
whatever changes of opinion or fact the progress of civilization may
introduce, to be unchangeably and forever a general slave market for
the rest of the Union? I confess that I, again, am disappointed in
that, among all the co