erally did not prove so numerous as each state
reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers, and
has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war.
The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found
as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we
shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the
Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home
prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very
adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we
sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire,
depending solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had
never so little hope against us as at present; and let them be ever so
sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay
at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our
own behind us that is a match for them.

"In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for
holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for
not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist
them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take
them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but that they
might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming over
here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won, both by us
and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support
all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if
all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist,
we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have
already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a
superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being
made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall
stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with
retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others,
we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction
from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change
your habits and make them like theirs.

"Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this
adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the
pride of the Pel