ngth I said,
"Although you do not fear divine laws, do you not fear civil laws?" They
replied, "No, we only fear certain of the ecclesiastical order; but we
conceal this in their presence; and if we cannot conceal it, we keep
upon good terms with them." I afterwards saw the former divided into
companies, and some of the latter cast into hell.
484. IV. TRIPLICATE ADULTERY IS WITH RELATIONS BY BLOOD. This adultery
is called triplicate, because it is threefold more grievous than the two
former. The relations, or remains of the flesh, which are not to be
approached, are mentioned in Levit. xviii. 6-18. There are internal and
external reasons why these adulteries are threefold more grievous than
the two above-mentioned: the internal reasons are grounded in the
correspondence of those adulteries with the violation of spiritual
marriage, which is that of the Lord and the church, and thence of good
and truth; and the external reasons are for the sake of guards, to
prevent a man's becoming a beast. We have no leisure, however, to
proceed to the further disclosure of these reasons.
485. V. THERE ARE FOUR DEGREES OF ADULTERIES, ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY
HAVE THEIR PREDICATIONS, THEIR CHARGES OF BLAME, AND AFTER DEATH THEIR
IMPUTATIONS. These degrees are not genera, but enter into each genus,
and cause its distinctions between more and less evil or good; in the
present case, deciding whether adultery of every genus from the nature
of the circumstances and contingencies, is to be considered milder or
more grievous. That circumstances and contingencies vary every thing is
well known. Nevertheless things are considered in one way by a man from
his rational light, in another by a judge from the law, and in another
by the Lord from the state of a man's mind: wherefore we mention
predications, charges of blame, and after death imputations; for
predications are made by a man according to his rational light, charges
of blame are made by a judge according to the law, and imputations are
made by the Lord according to the state of the man's mind. That these
three differ exceedingly from each other, may be seen without
explanation: for a man, from rational conviction according to
circumstances and contingencies, may acquit a person, whom a judge, when
he sits in judgement, cannot acquit from the law: and also a judge may
acquit a person, who after death is condemned. The reason of this is,
because a judge gives sentence according to the actio
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