m the understanding by the will. The knowledge of these
subjects is necessary, before the distinctions above-mentioned can be
seen by reason; but to express this knowledge on paper would require a
volume.

493. XIII. THE ADULTERIES COMMITTED BY THESE PERSONS ARE EXCEEDINGLY
GRIEVOUS, AND ARE IMPUTED TO THEM AS EVILS OF PURPOSE, AND REMAIN IN
THEM AS GUILT. The reason why they are exceedingly grievous, and more
grievous than the foregoing, is, because in them the will is the
principal agent, whereas in the foregoing the understanding is the
principal agent, and a man's life essentially is his will, and formally
is his understanding: the reason of this is, because the will acts in
unity with the love, and love is the essence of a man's life, and forms
itself in the understanding by such things as are in agreement with it:
wherefore the understanding viewed in itself is nothing but a form of
the will; and since love is of the will, and wisdom of the
understanding, therefore wisdom is nothing but a form of love; in like
manner truth is nothing but a form of good. That which flows from the
very essence of a man's life, thus which flows from his will or his
love, is principally called purpose; but that which flows from the form
of his life, thus from the understanding and its thought is called
intention. Guilt also is principally predicated of the will: hence comes
the common observation, that everyone has the guilt of evil from
inheritance, but that the evil is from the man. Hence these adulteries
of the fourth degree are imputed as evils of purpose, and remain in as
guilt.

494. XIV. ADULTERIES OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEGREES ARE EVILS OF SIN,
ACCORDING TO THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF UNDERSTANDING AND WILL IN THEM,
WHETHER THEY ARE ACTUALLY COMMITTED OR NOT. That adulteries of the
reason or the understanding, which are of the third degree, and
adulteries of the will, which are of the fourth, are grievous,
consequently evils of sin, according to the quality of the understanding
and of the will in them, may be seen from the comment above concerning
them, n. 490-493. The reason of this is, because a man (_homo_) is a man
by virtue of the will and the understanding; for from these two
principles exist not only all the things which are done in the mind, but
also all those which are done in the body. Who does not know, that the
body does not act of itself, but the will by the body? also that the
mouth does not speak of itself,