e. No idea will come forth from
negation, for it has no other content than that of the affirmative
judgment which it judges.

To be more precise, let us consider an existential, instead of an
attributive, judgment. If I say, "The object A does not exist," I mean
by that, first, that we might believe that the object A exists: how,
indeed, can we think of the object A without thinking it existing, and,
once again, what difference can there be between the idea of the object
A existing and the idea pure and simple of the object A? Therefore,
merely by saying "The object A," I attribute to it some kind of
existence, though it be that of a mere _possible_, that is to say, of a
pure idea. And consequently, in the judgment "The object A is not,"
there is at first an affirmation such as "The object A has been," or
"The object A will be," or, more generally, "The object A exists at
least as a mere _possible_." Now, when I add the two words "is not," I
can only mean that if we go further, if we erect the possible object
into a real object, we shall be mistaken, and that the possible of which
I am speaking is excluded from the actual reality as incompatible with
it. Judgments that posit the non-existence of a thing are therefore
judgments that formulate a contrast between the possible and the actual
(that is, between two kinds of _existence_, one thought and the other
found), where a person, real or imaginary, wrongly believes that a
certain possible is realized. Instead of this possible, there is a
reality that differs from it and rejects it: the negative judgment
expresses this contrast, but it expresses the contrast in an
intentionally incomplete form, because it is addressed to a person who
is supposed to be interested exclusively in the possible that is
indicated, and is not concerned to know by what kind of reality the
possible is replaced. The expression of the substitution is therefore
bound to be cut short. Instead of affirming that a second term is
substituted for the first, the attention which was originally directed
to the first term will be kept fixed upon it, and upon it alone. And,
without going beyond the first, we shall implicitly affirm that a second
term replaces it in saying that the first "is not." We shall thus judge
a judgment instead of judging a thing. We shall warn others or warn
ourselves of a possible error instead of supplying positive information.
Suppress every intention of this kind, give knowledge b