FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255  
256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   >>   >|  
e tell him he ought to affirm something else (though without specifying the affirmation which must be substituted). There is no longer then, simply, a person and an object; there is, in face of the object, a person speaking to a person, opposing him and aiding him at the same time; there is a beginning of society. Negation aims at some one, and not only, like a purely intellectual operation, at some thing. It is of a pedagogical and social nature. It sets straight or rather warns, the person warned and set straight being possibly, by a kind of doubling, the very person that speaks. So much for the second point; now for the first. We said that negation is but the half of an intellectual act, of which the other half is left indeterminate. If I pronounce the negative proposition, "This table is not white," I mean that you ought to substitute for your judgment, "The table is white," another judgment. I give you an admonition, and the admonition refers to the necessity of a substitution. As to what you ought to substitute for your affirmation, I tell you nothing, it is true. This may be because I do not know the color of the table; but it is also, it is indeed even more, because the white color is that alone that interests us for the moment, so that I only need to tell you that some other color will have to be substituted for white, without having to say which. A negative judgment is therefore really one which indicates a need of substituting for an affirmative judgment another affirmative judgment, the nature of which, however, is not specified, sometimes because it is not known, more often because it fails to offer any actual interest, the attention bearing only on the substance of the first. Thus, whenever I add a "not" to an affirmation, whenever I deny, I perform two very definite acts: (1) I interest myself in what one of my fellow-men affirms, or in what he was going to say, or in what might have been said by another _Me_, whom I anticipate; (2) I announce that some other affirmation, whose content I do not specify, will have to be substituted for the one I find before me. Now, in neither of these two acts is there anything but affirmation. The _sui generis_ character of negation is due to superimposing the first of these acts upon the second. It is in vain, then, that we attribute to negation the power of creating ideas _sui generis_, symmetrical with those that affirmation creates, and directed in a contrary sens
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255  
256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
affirmation
 

judgment

 

person

 
negation
 

substituted

 

generis

 

affirmative

 

substitute

 

interest

 

negative


admonition

 
nature
 

straight

 
object
 
intellectual
 

definite

 

affirms

 

fellow

 

perform

 

bearing


attention

 

actual

 

substance

 

anticipate

 

attribute

 
creating
 

superimposing

 

symmetrical

 

contrary

 

directed


creates

 

character

 
content
 

announce

 

affirm

 

operation

 

pronounce

 

proposition

 

indeterminate

 

purely


beginning
 
society
 

Negation

 

pedagogical

 

warned

 
speaks
 

doubling

 
social
 
moment
 

longer