FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304  
305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   >>   >|  
e world. He was, therefore, transcendent to the world, and the duration of things was juxtaposed to His eternity, of which it was only a weakening. But in the principle to which we are led by the consideration of universal mechanism, and which must serve as its substratum, it is not concepts or _things_, but laws or _relations_ that are condensed. Now, a relation does not exist separately. A law connects changing terms and is immanent in what it governs. The principle in which all these relations are ultimately summed up, and which is the basis of the unity of nature, cannot, therefore, be transcendent to sensible reality; it is immanent in it, and we must suppose that it is at once both in and out of time, gathered up in the unity of its substance and yet condemned to wind it off in an endless chain. Rather than formulate so appalling a contradiction, the philosophers were necessarily led to sacrifice the weaker of the two terms, and to regard the temporal aspect of things as a mere illusion. Leibniz says so in explicit terms, for he makes of time, as of space, a confused perception. While the multiplicity of his monads expresses only the diversity of views taken of the whole, the history of an isolated monad seems to be hardly anything else than the manifold views that it can take of its own substance: so that time would consist in all the points of view that each monad can assume towards itself, as space consists in all the points of view that all monads can assume towards God. But the thought of Spinoza is much less clear, and this philosopher seems to have sought to establish, between eternity and that which has duration, the same difference as Aristotle made between essence and accidents: a most difficult undertaking, for the [Greek: yle] of Aristotle was no longer there to measure the distance and explain the passage from the essential to the accidental, Descartes having eliminated it for ever. However that may be, the deeper we go into the Spinozistic conception of the "inadequate," as related to the "adequate," the more we feel ourselves moving in the direction of Aristotelianism--just as the Leibnizian monads, in proportion as they mark themselves out the more clearly, tend to approximate to the Intelligibles of Plotinus.[109] The natural trend of these two philosophies brings them back to the conclusions of the ancient philosophy. To sum up, the resemblances of this new metaphysic to that of the ancients ari
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303   304  
305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

monads

 
things
 

Aristotle

 

duration

 

immanent

 

principle

 
substance
 
transcendent
 

points

 

eternity


assume

 

relations

 

longer

 

consists

 

establish

 
measure
 

passage

 
explain
 

distance

 

sought


difference

 

Spinoza

 

thought

 
essence
 

ancients

 

undertaking

 

difficult

 

accidents

 
philosopher
 

essential


Intelligibles

 

Plotinus

 
natural
 

approximate

 

metaphysic

 

ancient

 
philosophy
 
conclusions
 

resemblances

 

philosophies


brings
 

proportion

 

deeper

 

Spinozistic

 

conception

 

However

 

Descartes

 
eliminated
 

inadequate

 
related