in future.
From Sjaelland Charles now hastened to Livonia with 8000 men. On the 6th
of October he had reached Pernau, with the intention of first relieving
Riga, but, hearing that Narva was in great straits, he decided to turn
northwards against the tsar. He set out for Narva on the 13th of
November, against the advice of all his generals, who feared the effect
on untried troops of a week's march through a wasted land, along boggy
roads guarded by no fewer than three formidable passes which a little
engineering skill could easily have made impregnable. Fortunately, the
two first passes were unoccupied; and the third, Pyhajoggi, was captured
by Charles, who with 400 horsemen put 6000 Russian cavalry to flight. On
the 19th of November the little army reached Lagena, a village about 9
m. from Narva, whence it signalled its approach to the beleaguered
fortress, and early on the following morning it advanced in battle
array. The attack on the Russian fortified camp began at two o'clock in
the afternoon, in the midst of a violent snowstorm; and by nightfall the
whole position was in the hands of the Swedes: the Russian army was
annihilated. The triumph was as cheap as it was crushing; it cost
Charles less than 2000 men.

After Narva, Charles XII. stood at the parting of ways. His best
advisers urged him to turn all his forces against the panic-stricken
Muscovites; to go into winter-quarters amongst them and live at their
expense; to fan into a flame the smouldering discontent caused by the
reforms of Peter the Great, and so disable Russia for some time to come.
But Charles's determination promptly to punish the treachery of Augustus
prevailed over every other consideration. It is easy from the
vantage-point of two centuries to criticize Charles XII. for neglecting
the Russians to pursue the Saxons; but at the beginning of the 18th
century his decision was natural enough. The real question was, which of
the two foes was the more dangerous, and Charles had many reasons to
think the civilized and martial Saxons far more formidable than the
imbecile Muscovites. Charles also rightly felt that he could never trust
the treacherous Augustus to remain quiet, even if he made peace with
him. To leave such a foe in his rear, while he plunged into the heart of
Russia would have been hazardous indeed. From this point of view
Charles's whole Polish policy, which has been blamed so long and so
loudly--the policy of placing a nominee of his o