my reorganization, which was first tested on
the field in 1809. As generalissimo of the army he had been made field
marshal some years before. As president of the Council of War, and
supported by the prestige of being the only general who had proved
capable of defeating the French, he promptly initiated a far-reaching
scheme of reform, which replaced the obsolete methods of the 18th
century, the chief characteristics of the new order being the adoption
of the "nation in arms" principle and of the French war organization and
tactics. The new army was surprised in the process of transition by the
war of 1809, in which Charles commanded in chief; yet even so it proved
a far more formidable opponent than the old, and, against the now
heterogeneous army of which Napoleon disposed (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS)
it succumbed only after a desperate struggle. Its initial successes were
neutralized by the reverses of Abensberg, Landshut and Eckmuhl; but,
after the evacuation of Vienna, the archduke won the great battle of
Aspern-Essling (q.v.) and soon afterwards fought the still more
desperate battle of Wagram (q.v.), at the close of which the Austrians
were defeated but not routed; they had inflicted upon Napoleon a loss of
over 50,000 men in the two battles. At the end of the campaign the
archduke gave up all his military offices, and spent the rest of his
life in retirement, except a short time in 1815, when he was governor of
Mainz. In 1822 he succeeded to the duchy of Saxe-Teschen. The archduke
Charles married, in 1815, Princess Henrietta of Nassau-Weilburg (d.
1829). He had four sons, the eldest of whom, the archduke Albert (q.v.)
became one of the most celebrated generals in Europe, and two daughters,
the elder of whom became queen of Naples. He died at Vienna on the 30th
of April 1847. An equestrian statue was erected to his memory in Vienna,
1860.

The caution which the archduke preached so earnestly in his strategical
works, he displayed in practice only when the situation seemed to demand
it, though his education certainly prejudiced him in favour of the
defensive at all costs. He was at the same time capable of forming and
executing the most daring offensive strategy, and his tactical skill in
the handling of troops, whether in wide turning movements, as at
Wurzburg and Zurich, or in masses, as at Aspern and Wagram, was
certainly equal to that of any leader of his time, Napoleon only
excepted. The campaign of 1796 is con