sidered almost faultless. That he
sustained defeat in 1809 was due in part to the great numerical
superiority of the French and their allies, and in part to the condition
of his newly reorganized troops. His six weeks' inaction after the
victory of Aspern is, however, open to unfavourable criticism. As a
military writer, his position in the evolution of the art of war is very
important, and his doctrines had naturally the greatest weight.
Nevertheless they cannot but be considered as antiquated even in 1806.
Caution and the importance of "strategic points" are the chief features
of his system. The rigidity of his geographical strategy may be gathered
from the prescription that "this principle is _never_ to be departed
from." Again and again he repeats the advice that nothing should be
hazarded unless one's army is _completely_ secure, a rule which he
himself neglected with such brilliant results in 1796. "Strategic
points," he says (not the defeat of the enemy's army), "decide the fate
of one's own country, and must constantly remain the general's main
solicitude"--a maxim which was never more remarkably disproved than in
the war of 1809. The editor of the archduke's work is able to make but a
feeble defence against Clausewitz's reproach that Charles attached more
value to ground than to the annihilation of the foe. In his tactical
writings the same spirit is conspicuous. His reserve in battle is
designed to "cover a retreat." The baneful influence of these antiquated
principles was clearly shown in the maintenance of Koniggratz-Josefstadt
in 1866 as a "strategic point," which was preferred to the defeat of the
separated Prussian armies; in the strange plans produced in Vienna for
the campaign of 1859, and in the "almost unintelligible" battle of
Montebello in the same year. The theory and the practice of the archduke
Charles form one of the most curious contrasts in military history. In
the one he is unreal, in the other he displayed, along with the greatest
skill, a vivid activity which made him for long the most formidable
opponent of Napoleon.

His writings were edited by the archduke Albert and his brother the
archduke William in the _Ausgewahlte Schriften weiland Sr. K. Hoheit
Erzh. Carl v. Osterreich_ (1862; reprinted 1893, Vienna and Leipzig),
which includes the _Grundsatze der Kriegskunst fur die Generale_
(1806), _Grundsatze der Strategie erlautert durch die Darstellung des
Feldzugs 1796_ (1814), _