e proof of the fact, unless the person, who resorts to
allegations usually so disgraceful, proves by the clearest evidence,
either documentary or borne by credible witnesses, that he or his
adversary was elsewhere than alleged during the whole day on which the
document is stated to have been executed.
13 Formerly, a man could not stipulate that a thing should be conveyed
to him after his own death, or after that of the promisor; nor could one
person who was in another's power even stipulate for conveyance after
that person's death, because he was deemed to speak with the voice of
his parent or master; and stipulations for conveyance the day before the
promisee's or promisor's decease were also void. Stipulation, however,
as has already been remarked, derive their validity from the consent
of the contracting parties, and we therefore introduced a necessary
emendation in respect also of this rule of law, by providing that a
stipulation shall be good which bargains for performance either after
the death, or the day before the death, of either promisee or promisor.
14 Again, a stipulation in the form: 'Do you promise to give today, if
such or such a ship arrives from Asia tomorrow?' was formerly void, as
being preposterous in its expression, because what should come last
is put first. Leo, however, of famous memory held that a preposterous
stipulation in the settlement of a dowry ought not to be rejected as
void, and we have determined to allow it perfect validity in every case,
and not merely in that in which it was formerly sanctioned.
15 A stipulation, say by Titius, in the form: 'Do you promise to give
when I shall die' or 'when you shall die'? is good now, as indeed it
always was even under the older law.
16 So too a stipulation for performance after the death of a third
person is good.
17 If a document in evidence of a contract states that so and so
promised, the promise is deemed to have been given in answer to a
preceding question.
18 When several acts of conveyance or performance are comprised in
a single stipulation, if the promisor simply answers: 'I promise to
convey,' he becomes liable on each and all of them, but if he answers
that he will convey only one or some of them, he incurs an obligation in
respect of those only which are comprised in his answer, there being
in reality several distinct stipulations of which only one or some
are considered to have acquired binding force: for for each act of
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