ecified through no fault of the
promisor. And a stipulation, such as 'do you promise to convey Lucius
Titius when he shall be a slave' and others like it, are also void from
the beginning; for objects which by their very nature cannot be owned by
man cannot either in any way be made the object of an obligation.

3 If one man promises that another shall convey, or do so and so, as,
for instance, that Titius shall give five aurei, he will not be bound,
though he will if he promises to get Titius to give them.

4 If a man stipulates for conveyance to, or performance in favour of,
another person who is not his paterfamilias, the contract is void;
though of course performance to a third person may be bargained for (as
in the stipulation 'do you promise to give to me or to Seius?'); where,
though the obligation is created in favour of the stipulator only,
payment may still be lawfully made to Seius, even against the
stipulator's will, the result of which, if it is done, being that the
promisor is entirely released from his obligation, while the stipulator
can sue Seius by the action of agency. If a man stipulates for payment
of ten aurei to himself and another who is not his paterfamilias, the
contract will be good, though there has been much doubt whether in such
a case the stipulator can sue for the whole sum agreed upon, or only
half; the law is now settled in favour of the smaller sum. If you
stipulate for performance in favour of one in your power, all benefit
under the contract is taken by yourself, for your words are as the words
of your son, as his words are as yours, in all cases in which he is
merely an instrument of acquisition for you.

5 Another circumstance by which a stipulation may be avoided is want of
correspondence between question and answer, as where a man stipulates
from you for payment of ten aurei, and you promise five, or vice versa;
or where his question is unconditional, your answer conditional, or vice
versa, provided only that in this latter case the difference is express
and clear; that is to say, if he stipulates for payment on fulfilment
of a condition, or on some determinate future day, and you answer: 'I.
promise to pay today,' the contract is void; but if you merely answer:
'I promise,' you are held by this laconic reply to have undertaken
payment on the day, or subject to the condition specified; for it is not
essential that every word used by the stipulator should be repeated in
the answ