rity for its "speedy extinction!"
[Footnote 9: Pittsburg pamphlet, (already alluded to,) p.9.]
[Footnote 10: Pittsburg pamphlet, p. 9.]
[Footnote 11: The same, p. 34.]
[Footnote 12: The same, p. 13.]
Higher authority than sustains _self-evident truths_ there cannot
be. As forms of reason, they are rays from the face of Jehovah.
Not only are their presence and power self-manifested, but they
also shed a strong and clear light around them. In their light,
other truths are visible. Luminaries themselves, it is their
office to enlighten. To their authority, in every department of
thought, the same mind bows promptly, gratefully, fully. And by their
authority, he explains, proves, and disposes of whatever engages his
attention and engrosses his powers as a reasonable and reasoning
creature. For what, when thus employed and when most successful, is
the utmost he can accomplish? Why, to make the conclusions which he
would establish and commend, _clear in the light of reason_;--in
other words, to evince that _they are reasonable_. He expects that
those with whom he has to do will acknowledge the authority of
principle--will see whatever is exhibited in the light of reason. If
they require him to go further, and, in order to convince them, to
do something more than show that the doctrines he maintains, and the
methods he proposes, are accordant with reason--are illustrated and
supported with "self-evident truths"--they are plainly "beside
themselves." They have lost the use of reason. They are not to be
argued with. They belong to the mad-house.
"COME NOW, LET US REASON TOGETHER, SAITH THE LORD."
Are we to honor the Bible, which Professor Stuart quaintly calls
"the good old book," by turning away from "self-evident truths" to
receive its instructions? Can these truths be contradicted or denied
there? Do we search for something there to obscure their clearness,
or break their force, or reduce their authority? Do we long to find
something there, in the form of premises or conclusions, of arguing
or of inference, in broad statement or blind hints, creed-wise or
fact-wise, which may set us free from the light and power of first
principles? And what if we were to discover what we were thus in
search of?--something directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly
prejudicial to the principles, which reason, placing us under the
authority of, makes self-evident? In what estimation, in that case,
should we be
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